MADRID, Spain – Three audio recordings have come to light between the drivers of the trains involved in the Urda crash and Adif’s control centre at Atocha which, far from clarifying what happened, show notable contradictions, with everything pointing to the Iryo driver having warned the control centre on two occasions that her convoy remained stopped, according to the audio of communications between the Iryo train and Adif’s command centre leaked to El País on Wednesday night.
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These audios contradict the version of Minister Óscar Puente, which indicated that Iryo did not apply the order to resume running before the accident “for unknown reasons.” Minutes earlier, the AVE driver had informed Adif’s control centre of a transmission failure related to the block system and was subsequently authorised to resume running at 8.36am, almost 20 minutes before the accident, according to another audio leaked to outlets including Cadena Ser and El Diario.es, meaning the AVE driver allegedly received the order to resume running at “normal” speed while, in parallel, the Iryo driver was reporting that she could not start.
According to the audios leaked to El País, the Iryo driver reported in a first call at 8.41am a loss of transmission of the LZB safety system and warned that she was stopped at Urda’s entry signal, with the controller then authorising her to resume “normal running” despite having given the same order five minutes earlier, at 8.36am, to the AVE travelling behind. However, at 8.48am, seven minutes after the first call and barely five minutes before the accident, the Iryo driver contacted Atocha again to report that she could not restart the system. “The train is not letting me restart the LZB system. And that’s why I’m still stopped at the entry signal,” she explained, with the controller replying that that was fine, as soon as she could, and to call if she had a problem. Meanwhile, another of the audios leaked on Wednesday to outlets including Cadena Ser captures another key moment, the first communication between the Renfe driver and Adif’s control centre between 8.31 and 8.36am, in which an operator authorised the Renfe AVE driver to continue at “normal running” despite a failure having occurred in the LZB safety system.
After several queries and clarifications about the procedure, the controller transmitted the instruction: “Driver of train 2080, disconnect and reconnect the LZB and resume running under the BSL at normal running,” telling him to disconnect and reconnect the system until, five minutes into the conversation, authorising him to continue at “normal running.” Although the Iryo remained immobilised, it does not appear in the conversations broadcast that the driver of the AVE travelling behind was warned, with the collision occurring five minutes after that last Iryo call, leaving at least 68 dead.
The government has maintained from the outset that it was due to “human error,” but the leaked conversations with the Iryo driver contradict that version and show that at 8.38am the Iryo driver was already in contact with the control centre and that at 8.48am, the moment the company identifies as the time of impact, the train had not received authorisation to resume running.
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At the press conference from the control centre at Atocha, Transport Minister Óscar Puente assured that the Iryo train did not apply the instruction to resume running despite the driver having received that order, for unknown reasons, saying the AVE had already done so and they did not know the reasons why the Iryo did not. The difference between the instructions established by the protocol and the authorisation finally transmitted to the driver now sits among the aspects highlighted to clarify the circumstances of the accident.
